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Abstract 
Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market. 
Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at 
the price that balances supply and demand. Buyers with bids above the clearing price 
pay that price, and suppliers with offers below the clearing price are paid that same 
price. This uniform-price auction, which occurs both daily and throughout the day, is 
complemented by forward energy markets. In practice, between 80 and 95 percent of 
wholesale electricity is traded in forward energy markets, often a month, or a year, and 
sometimes many years ahead of the spot market. However, because forward prices 
reflect spot prices, in the long run, the spot market determines the total cost of energy. It 
also plays a critical role in the least-cost scheduling and dispatch of resources, and 
provides an essential price signal both for short-run performance and long-run 
investment incentives. Arguments that the uniform-price auction yields electricity prices 
that are systematically too high are incorrect. However, insufficiently hedged spot 
prices will result in energy costs that fluctuate above and below the long-run average 
more than regulated prices and more than is socially optimal. Tampering with the spot 
price would cause inefficiency and raise long-term costs. The proper way to dampen the 
impact of spot price fluctuations is with long-term hedging. Although re-regulation can 
provide a hedge, there are less costly approaches.  
Introduction 
Recent large electricity price increases have led some to conclude that wholesale electricity 
markets have failed. The uniform-price auction, used to balance supply and demand in the spot 
energy market, is often suspected as the culprit.2 In this spot market, buyers and suppliers submit 
bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at the price that balances supply and 
demand. Buyers with bids at or above the clearing price pay the clearing price for the quantity 
purchased. Suppliers with offers at or below the clearing price are paid the clearing price for the 
quantity sold. Thus, a nuclear supplier with a marginal cost of $20/MWh would be paid 
$80/MWh for its quantity sold in the spot market, whenever the clearing price happened to be 
$80. Indeed, all suppliers are paid the highest variable cost among all those supplying spot 
energy.  
Doesn’t such a system cause consumers to systematically overpay for electricity? Absolutely 
not. Indeed, the clearing-price auction is an essential feature of any electricity market designed to 
reliably provide consumers electricity at minimum cost. The clearing-price auction plays a 
critical role in the least-cost scheduling and dispatch of resources, and provides an essential price 
signal both for short-run performance and long-run investment incentives. 
What then is responsible for the recent large increases in electricity prices? This is an 
important question and deserves an answer that goes deeper than an examination price formation 
in the spot market. Several long-run issues must be understood before the role of the spot market 
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can be correctly evaluated. Without this, there may be an incorrect assignment of blame and 
recommendations for changes that would prove costly in the long run. These are the factors—
from most important to least important—at work in the present situation. 
1. Fuel prices increasing sharply 
2. The removal of some retail price caps, an artifact of restructuring settlements 
3. Changes in relative fuel prices, resulting in short-run disequilibrium 
4. Insufficient long-term forward contracting 
5. The law of one price 
6. The uniform-price auction used in the spot market 
The first three factors are the drivers of present market developments; the last three concern 
the way the market responds to external forces. Rather than begin with an examination of a 
uniform price action, it is better to examine first why this has become a concern. A stylized 
description of recent events will serve to highlight the principles involved and explain the main 
effects. Since electricity markets opened in 1998, the power industry has developed as follows.  
Stage 1: Overbuilding followed by high gas prices. At first, gas prices were low and gas-
fired generation appeared cheaper than alternatives. In a competitive market, this opens the door 
to high profits for companies that build new gas-fired plants. But this door will only stay open 
until a new equilibrium with sufficient gas generation has been reached. This led to a flood of 
new gas-fired plants. But investors soon faced two unpleasant surprises. Wholesale prices were 
kept lower than they expected and gas prices shot up. The result was a complete reversal. There 
are now too many, not too few, gas-fired plants and they are relatively expensive, not relatively 
cheap. 
The new disequilibrium produces new winners and losers. First, owners of gas-fired plants 
are clearly hurt. There is too much capacity and wholesale prices have been suppressed by 
mitigation rules. The result is that gas-fired plants recover little of their fixed costs and 
experience a windfall loss. This loss is a windfall gain for consumers. Because gas prices are 
high and because the wholesale price is frequently set by gas plants, cheaper plants, nuclear and 
coal plants, experience a windfall gain. When the wholesale price is $80, those with $20 variable 
costs collect $60 towards their fixed-cost recovery. This has proved to be more than enough. 
This windfall gain to baseload plants is a windfall loss to consumers. 
So far, the net impact on consumers is unknown. Two effects have worked in favor of 
consumers: (1) the market has been overbuilt, and (2) market rules have held peak prices 
somewhat below a long-run competitive level. But the disequilibrium effect has worked against 
consumers. It seems likely that at first consumes received a net benefit, but are now on the losing 
end of the cycle. But markets are never static, and this is changing. The market is signaling for 
the entry of new baseload plants, but for a halt to gas-fired plant construction. In reality, the 
construction of new baseload plants will be slow, but the halt of investment in new gas-fired 
plants was quick and complete. The net result will be a tightening of supply and an increase in 
wholesale prices. 
This price increase, due to a tightened supply, has as yet had little impact. Instead the current 
price increases are driven by increased fuel costs and changes in regulated retail price caps. 
These changes are readily understood, and consequently this paper will continue to focus on the 
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deeper economic issues, which are pertinent to the controversy over the uniform-price spot 
market. 
Stage 2: High gas prices without surplus capacity. In the coming stage of the market, we 
cannot be sure of the price outcomes, but it is entirely possible that gas-fired plants will again 
break-even, baseload plants will increase their windfall gains, and consumers will suffer windfall 
losses for some time to come. This will only exacerbate present difficulties. That outcome could 
result from the following dynamic. New capacity will be needed to match load growth. If there 
are barriers that slow the entry of baseload plants, the new entry will need to be gas-fired peakers 
and shoulder plants. These will only enter if the current and future profitability of gas-fired 
plants increases to the break-even level. The new ICAP market rules will allow this, and thereby 
prevent a shortage of capacity and blackouts, but in doing so, they will raise revenues for all 
types of plants, peakers, shoulder, and baseload.3 
There is no certainty this will happen, and this paper is not predicting it, but simply pointing 
out that it is possible. This possibility is relevant because it is apparently the essence of the fear 
behind the criticism of uniform spot prices. By making it explicit, that fear can be addressed 
analytically. The problem, then, is that the market could, for a few years, produce an outcome in 
which consumers experienced a windfall loss as the result of nuclear and coal plants 
experiencing a windfall gain. This raises a number of questions that have not been well 
addressed in the discussion of deregulated electricity markets. Are windfall gains and losses for 
consumers a normal part of a well functioning market? How should these be controlled? Are the 
windfalls of Stage 2 the result of a well-functioning market, or of market flaws? Short versions 
of our answers may be helpful before delving into the analysis. 
1. Well functioning markets do produce windfall gains and losses for consumers as well as 
for suppliers. On average, consumers pay only long-run cost, neither more nor less. 
2. Windfalls can be controlled as well in a market setting as in a regulated setting. This is 
done with long-term contracts. 
3. The windfalls of stage two are due to insufficient long-term forward contracting, and may 
be exacerbated by barriers to entry against certain types of plants. 
Spot markets, forward markets, and uniform prices 
The hypothetical Stage 2 outcome, with windfall profits for baseload plants, is primarily the 
result of fundamental economic forces. The relative prices of gas and coal, and of gas and 
uranium changed dramatically in a short time. In a market with long-term capital assets and 
incomplete hedging, such price changes produce a windfall for the supplier using the fuel type 
that has gained the advantage. This has nothing to do with the intricate details of the spot market. 
In part, this is a benefit of a market. It pays extra profits to those who invest in the low-cost 
technology, in this case, new nuclear or coal plants. This stimulates good investment and lowers 
long-term costs. It is essential that the spot market operate in this way; otherwise investors will 
have no reason to choose wisely. The agreement on this is near universal. But what is the 
implication for existing plants? Does the spot market need to pay windfall profits to existing 
plants or only to new investments? 
Separating existing from new. It is necessary for better plants to be more profitable, 
otherwise the market can provide no guidance for building better plants. But once they are built, 
it may seem unnecessary to continue this guidance. This is the seeming paradox at the heart of 
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the sensible question concerning a uniform-price spot market. There is also another question 
which causes confusion: Why shouldn’t we try to hold everyone’s spot price down to their 
variable cost. This will be taken up in detail later, but the answer is virtually self-evident—
because no investor would ever build a plant if fixed costs were not recovered. When the market 
is in equilibrium, uniform prices simply cover variable plus fixed costs. That cannot be argued 
with. But the question of paying windfall gains through a uniform-price spot market is much 
deeper, and deserves serious attention. 
Suppose we have a power market that is competitive, well designed with a uniform-price 
spot market, and in equilibrium with respect to the types of generating capacity that it has in 
place. It will pay all plants just enough to cover their fixed and variable costs. Now suppose the 
price of gas quadruples and all gas plants are on the margin, and so set the spot price, one-half 
the time. This will not help gas plants, which face much higher fuel costs, but it will raise 
revenues for nuclear plants enormously without any corresponding increase in production costs, 
because the price of uranium is unrelated to the price of gas. What should be done about this? 
Two courses of action are suggested: (1) pay nuclear plants less than the market-clearing spot 
price, or (2) remind under-hedged load serving entities (LSEs) that they should have more long 
term contracts. If most LSEs are not well hedged, this may be a painful choice, but it is the 
choice we must examine. 
Consequences of price discrimination. Ignore the possible legal problems (antitrust laws 
prohibit price discrimination in wholesale markets), and consider a discriminatory spot market in 
which nuclear plants would be paid only enough to cover their fixed and variable costs. This 
might be done by capping their spot price at the level the price would have been without the gas 
price increase. Although that is not easy, for simplicity let us assume it is possible. What are the 
consequences? First, in the short-run, there is certainly no problem. Existing plants will more 
than cover variable costs, and so will still have an incentive to provide electricity. Second, 
existing nuclear plants will continue to earn a normal rate of return, despite the high gas price. 
However, it is insufficient to focus solely on the short run. Markets must also provide the 
right incentives for long-run investment. What will happen in the long run? That depends on the 
unspoken part of this new policy of capping profits at a normal level. What will be done when 
things go the other way for nuclear plants and they come on hard times? What if gas prices, 
rather than quadrupling, are halved? Again two possibilities must be considered: (1) their spot 
prices will be adjusted up above the market-clearing prices so that their profits stay at the normal 
level, or (2) they are given the market-clearing price and suffer a windfall loss. 
But now we see the problem. Holding their profits constant by always adjusting their spot 
price is just rate-of-return regulation. Regulating all nuclear plants so that they always make a 
normal rate of return will completely remove the market’s investment signals. Investors will 
know that no matter how many such plants have been built they can always build one more and 
make what the regulator has determined to be a normal rate of return. Hence, if investors like this 
rate of return, they will just keep building, and if they do not, they will not build any more. This 
will force the regulator to take over the investment decision, and a principal benefit of moving to 
competitive electricity markets would be lost. This shows that preventing the signals of a 
uniform-price spot market, if done carefully, simply leads back to rate-of-return regulation. 
One caution is in order and it foreshadows the coming analysis. If the nuclear plant has sold 
its power under, let us suppose, a ten-year contract for differences, for the original equilibrium 
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average price, then imposing a regulated low spot price will impose on it an enormous windfall 
loss. Its customer will be paying high spot prices, and the nuclear plant will have to make up the 
difference between those and the contract price while not getting paid the high spot price itself. 
This could be remedied by having the regulator take over the contract. 
The second option for price discrimination is to cap the nuclear unit when it would make 
excess profit and pay it the uniform spot price when it would suffer a windfall loss. Under such a 
policy no investor will ever build a nuclear plant. They will know that the regulator will take 
their windfall gains and let them keep their windfall losses. Moreover, investors in every other 
type of plant will expect that if they make windfall gains, the same policy will likely be applied 
to them. Such a policy is much worse than either regulation or a competitive market. The result 
under such a policy is that the government is forced to purchase all new generating capacity, and 
in the long-run the electricity industry becomes a state-run enterprise. 
Consequence of forward contracting. Long-term forward contracting is a more subtle 
approach to the problem. First consider what happens if existing nuclear plants have complete 
forward contracts. Suppose they have signed contracts with LSEs selling their average annual 
output for as long as the plant remains operational at the average price they receive in the ideal 
equilibrium before the gas price increase. In this case, existing nuclear plants will not profit at all 
from the gas price increase. This is the same as under the price discrimination proposal. But for 
new investors, there is a world of difference. Once the gas price goes up, a new investor can go 
to an LSE and offer to sell power from a new nuclear plant at a higher price than is charged by 
existing nuclear plants, but at a lower price than will be charged by gas plants. If there is only 
one nuclear investor, that investor can capture the entire windfall profit stream from the higher 
spot prices due to the gas-price increase. This provides a huge incentive for new investment. 
So, with complete forward contracting, existing plants capture no windfall profits, but new 
plants can potentially capture up to all of them. What will happen? With more than one investor 
there will be competition and the price of power from the new nuclear plant will be bid down. 
With enough competition it will be only the slightest bit higher than the price of power from an 
existing plant. With complete forward contracting and near-perfect competition, there is no extra 
profit for nuclear plants, new or existing. In spite of this, the potential for nuclear profits if there 
is no new nuclear investment is so great that it assures investment—unless there is some strong 
barrier to entry. Hence, with complete forward contracting, the market does just what we want. 
Let us look more closely at the uniform-price spot market. When gas prices go up, the spot 
price goes up, and nuclear plants are paid more whenever gas is on the margin. But since the 
plants have already sold their power, they cannot pocket the higher prices, but must use the extra 
revenue to make their customers whole. They may sell the power to customers directly at the low 
long-term price determined by their own costs. Alternatively, their customers may buy from the 
system operator at the high spot price, and the plant may sell at the high spot price, and then pay 
their customer the difference between the high spot price and the low long-term contract price. 
Either way, the existing nuclear plants make no windfall profits. 
What if there are no forward contracts? Without forward contracts, does a uniform-price 
spot market over-charge consumers? Not on average. If the spot market provided suppliers with 
windfall profits on average, investors would be delighted and build plants with exuberance. We 
saw this in the early days of the market and the result was low profits or losses. This is the 
paradox that makes markets work. If profits are high, then profits will fall in response to entry. If 
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they are low, no investor will enter and profits will rise in response to growth in demand. The 
result is that spot-market profits bounce around a bit, but they cannot be persistently high or 
low—on average the spot price is just right. However, there are two exceptions: (1) spot prices 
can be persistently too high if there are significant barriers to entry—then existing suppliers can 
enjoy windfall profits that correspond to the cost required to overcome the entry barrier, and (2) 
spot prices can be persistently too low if there are significant subsidies to suppliers of electricity. 
The result is that, absent entry barriers or subsidies, the suppliers will not, on average, make 
windfall profits, and consumers will not, on average, have windfall losses. 
So, on average, the uniform spot price will be fair to both consumers and suppliers. What 
then, is the need for forward contracting? Forward contracts eliminate risk for both suppliers and 
consumers. They provide mutual insurance. If the nuclear plant is lucky and the consumer 
unlucky, the plant gives its winnings to the consumer. If the consumer is lucky and the plant 
unlucky, the consumer gives its winnings to the plant. In this way both are insured, and total risk 
is reduced. The reduction can be dramatic. Both consumers and investors view risk as a cost, so 
reducing both their risks reduces their costs. Competition will pass the cost savings on to 
consumers and leave suppliers, as always, with a normal rate of return that simply covers all their 
costs including the (reduced) cost of risk and normal fixed and variable costs. Hence consumers 
will find themselves with less risk and with more money in their pockets. This is one reason 
forward contracts matter. 
The second reason lies a bit outside the scope of normal economics. Without forward 
contracts, consumers will, sometimes for years, experience below-long-run prices. This can 
happen for example when the market is overbuilt. They will become used to these and they will 
consider them the “right price.” Then when their windfall losses come, there will be much noise 
and commotion, accompanied by the perfectly correct observation that prices are above the long-
run average because certain plants are making windfall profits. The result will be attempts to 
interfere with the market design, quite likely by attacking the policy of a uniform spot price. On 
a particularly disruptive path, this may lead back toward regulation or may simply break the 
market’s investment incentives and require high risk premiums to maintain reliability. 
Does Regulation Handle the Problem Better? Regulation is a kind of long-term contract and 
consequently it has wonderful risk-reducing properties. Regulated costs may be too high, but 
there will be little profit risk and generally less risk of price-shocks for consumers. In terms of 
risk, it is much like the ultimate long-term contracts described above. Of course in either case 
one may sign a long-term contract for a technology the turns out to be too expensive, so there is 
still some risk. When comparing regulation with fully hedged markets, the difference lies 
primarily in the investment and performance incentives. Here the market has all the advantage. 
Although economists like to assume optimal forward contracting because it makes the 
analysis simpler and the outcome rosy, real markets appear not to conform to this assumption. 
This presents a problem that cannot be solved analytically, and for which we have little data. If 
the market will not purchase enough long-term forward contracts, does the cost of additional risk 
outweigh the gain from better incentives? Generally economists judge the benefits of better 
incentives to outweigh the cost of additional risk, and choose markets over regulation unless 
there is some overriding consideration. 
If the market path is followed, this analysis leads to one clear positive recommendation. 
Reduce market risk. This does not mean to reduce performance risk, as that would remove the 
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incentives that are the entire point of using a market. Much risk can be eliminated with a well 
designed capacity market,4 but this will not eliminate the risks caused by shifts in relative fuel 
prices. These risks need to be hedged by long-term contracts between generation and load. 
Encouraging such contracts is not simple, but it is the proper focus for as long as a market course 
is pursued. This will improve the market, whereas tampering with the uniform spot price could 
destroy it. 
Changing the energy spot market from uniform-pricing to pay-as-bid 
pricing does not help, and probably hurts 
Some have proposed to replace the uniform-price auction with a pay-as-bid auction. The 
argument is that with a pay-as-bid auction, a supplier would be paid an amount that more closely 
corresponds to the supplier’s cost. Thus, a nuclear unit with a marginal cost of $20/MWh would 
be paid something closer to $20, even when the clearing price is set by a gas unit with a marginal 
cost of $80/MWh. Such an outcome is simply wishful thinking; it would only occur if the 
nuclear unit were forced to offer at $20/MWh, rather than a profit maximizing offer, which 
would be much closer to $80 than $20, if a pay-as-bid auction were used. 
The benefits of a uniform-price auction in organizing trade between buyers and sellers is 
well understood. Absent market power, the uniform-price auction yields a competitive 
equilibrium, and the competitive equilibrium is efficient: the outcome maximizes social welfare. 
At least in theory, the right quantity of electricity is produced by the least-cost suppliers, and this 
electricity is consumed by the buyers that value it the most. 
Of course, real markets, including electricity markets, do not achieve the ideal of perfect 
competition, but there is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work that shows that the 
convergence to full efficiency is rapid as a market becomes more competitive.5 
Despite these virtues of a uniform-price spot market, can’t prices be reduced by a switch to 
pay-as-bid pricing? This question has been a frequent source of debate and study by economists. 
In a nutshell, here are the theoretical, empirical, and practical answers.6  
The theoretical answer is ambiguous. It depends on the particulars of the model. However, 
in the simplest cases, the answer is that it makes no difference. Both uniform-price and pay-as-
bid approaches result in the same expected prices. 
The empirical answer is consistent with theory. It depends on the particulars of the setting. 
However, the overwhelming evidence is that to the extent there are any differences in expected 
prices the differences are typically small and often insignificant. 
From a practical perspective, there are a number of reasons that in the setting of electricity 
spot markets, uniform-pricing should be preferred.  
First, the electricity spot market is a two-sided market in which both suppliers and 
demanders bid. The uniform-price auction has an obvious virtue in that the money paid by 
demanders is exactly equal to the money received by suppliers. In contrast, with the pay-as-bid 
format, the wedge between the winning demand bids and the winning supply offers is extra 
money paid by demanders, but not paid to suppliers. What is done with this extra money? [many 
readers may think extra money is more of a virtue than exact balance. Would it be correct to say 
that unless this money is returned to demanders, they will generally pay more under pay as bid, 
and if it is returned there will be squabbles over the rule? Just call this as you see it know need to 
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discuss.] In the UK, which is the only market we are aware of that uses pay-as-bid pricing, the 
extra money is whimsically called “beer money.” Although this “beer money” has steadily 
shrunk since pay-as-bid pricing was introduced, suggesting the law of one price is at work, it 
remains surprisingly large. However, closer examination of the market reveals that the source of 
the significant spread between seller offers and buyer bids are artificial transaction costs in the 
UK spot market intended to discourage its use.  
Second, pay-as-bid pricing causes profit maximizing suppliers to estimate the clearing price 
and bid as closely to the clearing price as possible, whenever the clearing price is above the 
supplier’s variable cost. The result is as-bid supply schedules that are all very flat and close to 
the expected clearing price. The problem is that there is uncertainty in the supplier’s estimates of 
prices. Sometimes a low-cost supplier bids higher than a high-cost supplier, so that the high-cost 
supplier is asked to supply and the low-cost supplier is not. This happens because the supplier’s 
bid has much to do with its guess about the clearing price and little to do with its cost. In 
contrast, with uniform-pricing, the primary determinant of a supplier’s offer is the supplier’s 
marginal cost. As a result, dispatch inefficiencies are much more common under pay-as-bid 
pricing than under uniform-pricing. In the long-run, dispatch inefficiencies raise costs, and these 
higher costs are ultimately passed on to consumers. 
Third—and most subtle—uniform pricing is procompetitive in the following sense. With 
pay-as-bid pricing, the bidder’s incentive is to bid as close to the clearing price as possible. 
Indeed, the pay-as-bid auction may be renamed “Guess the Clearing Price.” The pay-as-bid 
auction rewards those that can best guess the clearing price. Typically, this favors larger 
companies that can spend more on forecasting, and are more likely to set the clearing price as a 
result of their size. In sharp contrast, uniform pricing favors the smaller companies (or those with 
small unhedged positions going into the market). With uniform pricing, the big suppliers make 
room for the smaller rivals. The small suppliers are able to free-ride on the exercise of market 
power by the large suppliers. Thus, the exercise of market power with pay-as-bid pricing, 
because it favors larger bidders, will tend to encourage consolidation and discourage entry; 
whereas the exercise of market power with uniform pricing encourages entry and reduces 
concentration. As a result, the market may evolve to more competitive structures under uniform 
pricing. This self-correcting feature of uniform pricing is especially valuable in markets like 
electricity that are repeated regularly. 
A final nail can be driven in the coffin of pay-as-bid optimism by considering the long run. 
Suppose the clearing price was so hard to guess that baseload plants guessed 20% lower than the 
actual clearing price on average in order to avoid missing a sale. They would earn less profit 
relative to other plants than under a uniform-price auction—just as hoped for by pay-as-bid 
advocates. Would that save consumers money? For a few years, it would, but no new baseload 
plant would be built until their profits returned to normal. This would only happen when a 
sufficient shortage of baseload plants had developed. That shortage would raise clearing prices in 
some hours when baseload is on or near the margin. This would just compensate for the 20% 
discount. As a consequence all plants would then be paid the same (their fixed plus variable 
costs), but the mix of plants would be inefficiently tilted away from baseload plants, because 
pay-as-bid would have discriminated against them. Consequently the average cost of producing 
electricity would increase. In other words, after a few years, even if pay-as-bid did work as 
hoped, consumers would still end up paying more. 
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Why energy prices are rising and what to do about it 
We now return to the six factors responsible for rising electricity prices and provide some 
perspective. The first, and by far the largest factor, is simply the change in fuel costs, and in 
particular but not exclusively gas prices, over the last five years. This would increase electricity 
prices under any regime. The evidence that increases in fuel prices has been a major cause of 
increases in energy prices is compelling.  
In PJM, the largest of the electricity markets, once we adjust for fuel cost, the spot energy 
price, which began at about $25/MWh, fell to about $20/MWh, and has remained there for the 
last six years, as shown below. However, the particular form of adjustment used in the graph 
assumes the law of one price and a complete lack of forward contracting. It demonstrates that 
some combination of market power reductions and efficiency gains have improved the market’s 
performance, possibly in conjunction with some price suppression.7 It also shows that, within a 
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The second factor is the removal of retail rate caps. Some consumers have been temporarily 
protected from higher prices by retail rate caps. Naturally, when these caps are lifted, consumers 
experience rate shock. Even without such caps, consumers would have experienced a more 
gradual but more prolonged increase in prices. The only possible remedy for this problem is a 
shift from gas-fired generation to baseload generation, and, as described above, the market 
provides strong incentives for this shift. 
The third factor is the shift to a disequilibrium in which, because baseload plants have a 
new-found advantage over gas-fired generation, they are in short supply. Being in short supply 
means they cannot set the price often enough, and instead, expensive gas plants set the price.  
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To investigate the impact of this factor, the graph above needs to be augmented with a 
comparison of wholesale energy prices and total fuel costs. This would allow an estimate of the 
extent to which disequilibrium in the stock of installed capacity has contributed to the windfall 
gains of baseload plants and the windfall losses of consumers. Such calculations would help 
focus attention on the need for better forward contracting.  
The remedy for disequilibrium, as just noted, is more baseload capacity. This will take gas 
off the margin during some shoulder hours and lower the average price. When there are enough 
baseload units, they will no longer earn any windfall profits in the spot market. 
An important question is whether there are barriers that will prevent the market from 
returning to equilibrium in this way. That is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
important to note that the magnitude of the windfall consumer loss is closely tied to the size of 
such barriers. If the barriers are large, the problem could persist for many years; if they are low it 
might correct itself in only a few years. This report is not meant to suggest the barriers are large 
or difficult to remove; in fact they may be minimal or easily eliminated. The point is simply that 
to the extent they are allowed to exist, they will tend to cause windfall profits for existing 
baseload units. 
The fourth factor, insufficient long-term forward contracting, is crucial. If complete long-
term contracts were in place the disequilibrium problem would vanish. Unfortunately, forward 
contracting will not fix the problem after the fact. Once your house is on fire, fire insurance 
covering that fire is very expensive. California’s experience with long-term contracts, during and 
after its electricity crisis beginning in 2000 is another vivid example.  
An investigation of the extent of forward contracting would show that the consumers have 
not, in fact, experienced the entire cost increase implied by the spot price increases shown in the 
above graph. If an estimate of this effect could be made it would illustrate the benefits of forward 
contracting. 
To protect against unexpected price increases, the forward contract must be signed while the 
increase is still unexpected. This does not mean it is too late to increase forward contract 
coverage. Rather it means that long-term forward contracts should be acquired by load in a way 
consistent with risk management and investment principles. Too often, load’s contracting 
strategy appears to mimic that of the stock investor who looks only at past returns and buys 
yesterday’s winners. The result is an outcome much worse than random purchase. Unfortunately, 
sound contracting by load has been frustrated by the absence of a well-defined representative of 
load to sign sensible long-term contracts. This is another basic problem that is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
Even if forward contracting is executed according to the best risk-management principles, it 
must be remembered that it will not, on average reduce expenditures—only the variance in those 
expenditures. The present disequilibrium does not represent a bias in the market. Had fuel costs 
shifted in the other direction the tables would have been turned. Similarly, forward contracting 
will increase consumer costs as often as it decreases them. Its benefit is to reduce risk—to 
counteract the spot market fluctuations by canceling both unexpected losses and unexpected 
gains. 
The fifth factor is the law of one price. Under any market design, if the price of a MWh is 
high, a baseload plants will manage to get that high price, even if its costs are low. The law of 
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one price plays a crucial role. It is not a law of nature, but it is a law that all competitive markets 
follow. As long as the market design remains competitive, there is little that can be done about 
this. Efforts to introduce price discrimination may succeed in the short-run, but in the long-run 
investment incentives are damaged and consumer costs are increased. 
The sixth factor is the uniform-price design of the spot market. This is thought to be 
important when the law of one price is not recognized. Then it is often presumed that simply 
changing to pay-as-bid will up-end the law of one price. Fortunately, it will not. Suppliers that 
now bid zero, knowing the clearing price will be well above their marginal cost, will stop 
bidding zero if they are paid as bid. They will instead bid as close as they dare to the clearing 
price. While it is possible this will have a tiny depressing effect on the spot price, the result of 
lower prices will be that a few investments in new capacity will be discouraged (perhaps even 
before the pay-as-bid rule takes effect), supply will tighten, and the average spot price will be 
exactly where it would be under the uniform-price rule. Moreover, the uncertainty caused by 
forcing suppliers to bid based on their estimates of other’s bids, instead of on the basis of their 
own costs, will reduce the efficiency of the dispatch. The net result will be to increase cost to 
consumers. 
Conclusion 
Three recommendations emerge from our analysis. 
1. Do not switch from uniform-pricing to pay-as-bid pricing in the energy spot market. 
Hopes of saving money through price discrimination are naïve. Such a switch likely 
will increase consumer costs. 
2. Do not attempt a regulatory taking of windfall profits and a regulatory allowing of 
windfall losses. Even if such a strategy achieved some short-run cost relief, it would 
destroy investment incentives, and thus, in the long-run, destroy the market. 
3. Do look for sensible ways to encourage long-term forward contracts that hedge fuel-
price shifts. Long-term contracts are the only market mechanism available to address 
the present concern.  
Recommendations 1 and 2 are easy to implement. Recommendation 3 is much more difficult 
to follow. It requires solving one of the most important practical problems in electricity markets 
today. In today’s markets, it remains unclear who should sign long-term forward contracts on 
behalf of residential and other small consumers. It is easy to say that contracts should be signed 
that are consistent with sound risk-management and investment strategy, but it is hard to 
implement when there is no counter-party to the contract. Residential and other small consumers 
are not represented properly in the current market design. This fact, not the design of the spot 
market, is at the heart of the current challenges in today’s electricity markets. 
One solution adopted in some states, such as New Jersey and more recently Illinois, is to 
require the electricity distribution companies to purchase long-term forward contracts from 
suppliers for residential and other small consumers. These contracts are procured in a sensible 
way via a competitive annual auction in which n-year contracts are purchased each year to cover 
a 1/n share of load. For example, New Jersey procures 3-year contracts covering 1/3rd of load 
each year. Of course, consumers could enjoy even greater insurance from fuel-price shifts with 
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contracts of even longer-term, procured on a more frequent basis, but there are credit and other 
issues that limit the optimal contract length. 
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